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“It is hard to do empirical studies of statutory overrides, because it is very 
hard to find them all.”1 
—Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr. 
 
I. Introduction 
Professor William N. Eskridge, Jr., and Matthew R. Christiansen’s new 
article analyzing more than forty years of Congressional overrides is a very 
significant achievement.
2
  The article builds on Professor Eskridge’s 
groundbreaking study, published in 1991, that demonstrated conclusively 
that Congress monitors judicial activity and regularly responds to statutory 
 
 * Associate Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. First and foremost, I thank 
Bill Eskridge and Matt Christiansen for conducting their study.  It is a significant advance in our 
understanding of overrides, and it is an honor to respond to it. I am also personally grateful that Bill 
and Matt were willing to share their data with me, even prior to publication, to assist me with a 
project of my own that explores the extent to which courts continue to rely on overridden 
precedents.  I also thank my coauthor on that project, Brian Broughman, for being my thought 
partner in exploring these issues and for sharing his statistical and methodological expertise with 
me, including assisting me with the data analysis that I did for this response.  Additionally, I thank 
Rick Hasen and Matt Christiansen for helpful comments on an earlier draft.  Matt Pfaff provided 
excellent research assistance.  And finally, I thank the editorial staff of the Texas Law Review See 
Also for inviting me to write this response and for helping finalize it for publication. 
1. Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme 
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967-2011, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 1317, 1325 (2014). 
2. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1. 
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interpretation decisions.
3
  The new study, however, goes far beyond the 1991 
study in the depth and scope of its analysis, and it should dramatically 
reframe the way in which scholars approach the study of overrides.  Indeed, 
although the most publicized overrides are highly charged debates in which 
Congress forcefully repudiates a judicial interpretation as misrepresenting 
prior Congressional intent,
4
 Christiansen and Eskridge conclude such 
“restorative” overrides are actually rather rare.  By contrast, they find that the 
majority of overrides “update” or “clarify” policy,5 often in response to a 
specific plea from the Supreme Court to do so.
6
  They also deepen our 
understanding of factors that are highly correlated with overrides, including 
their provocative findings that cases that rely upon the whole act or whole 
code canons of statutory interpretation are disproportionately likely to be 
overridden
7
 and that women and minority groups now increasingly look to 
Congress rather than the courts to enforce and expand principles of equality.
8
  
They offer several sensible proposals to make overrides more effective,
9
 
important insights about the central role that agencies play in both generating 
and implementing overrides,
10
 and a nuanced exploration of the problems 
that may result from a dramatic decrease in override activity in recent 
years.
11
 
All of this thoughtful analysis invites further exploration and debate.
12
  
For purposes of this response, however, my comments focus on a 
threshold—but crucially important—point: It is a major accomplishment 
simply to compile a relatively comprehensive list of overrides.  Christiansen 
and Eskridge frame their new study in part as a response to the New York 
Times’s declaration, based on a recent study by Professor Richard L. Hasen, 
that overrides have “fallen to almost none.”13  They explain their 
significantly different findings—Christiansen and Eskridge identify 122 
 
3. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 
YALE L.J. 331 (1991). 
4. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1374–75. 
5. See id. at 1370–74. 
6. See id. at 1409–13. 
7. See id. at 1401–08. 
8. See id. at 1381–82. 
9. See id. at 1439–73. 
10. See id. at 1375–80, 1450–58. 
11. See id. at 1473–79. 
12. I have already begun to plumb their data for a forthcoming project on ongoing reliance on 
overridden precedents, and I am sure that many others will use their incredibly rich data set to 
further deepen our understanding of overrides. 
13. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1318 (quoting Adam Liptak, In Congress’s 
Paralysis, A Mightier Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/ 
08/21/us/politics/supreme-court-gains-power-from-paralysis-of-congress.html?_r=0); see also 
Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress, 
86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 209 (2013). 
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overrides between 1991 and 2011, whereas Hasen identifies just 46 overrides 
in the same time period—as the result of different methodologies employed 
for identifying overrides.
14
  That said, as emphasized by the quotation that 
opened this essay and a similar statement by Hasen, both research teams 
agree that it is very difficult to identify overrides.
15
 
In this essay, I argue the differing results of these two studies represent 
more than simply two distinct methodologies for identifying overrides. 
Rather, in fundamental ways, they speak to the efficacy of overrides. As 
discussed more fully below, Hasen, using the methodology first pioneered by 
Professor Eskridge in his 1991 study, identified overrides primarily by 
looking for statements in Congressional committee reports that indicated an 
intent to override a prior decision; in the new study, Christiansen and 
Eskridge combine review of legislative history with a review of all court 
decisions on Westlaw that flagged a prior precedent as having been affected 
by subsequent statutory action.  Thus, although Christiansen and Eskridge do 
not characterize their research methods in this matter, they moved from a 
methodology that focuses primarily on ex ante signals from Congress to one 
that relies heavily on ex post analysis by courts.  Below, I do original 
analysis of Christiansen and Eskridge’s data and find that the data set of 
overrides they identified differed from Hasen’s not only in number but also 
in kind.  In short, the Congress-centered methodology that Hasen employed 
was far more effective at identifying overrides that Christiansen and Eskridge 
classify as “restorative” and “deep” than it was at identifying updating or 
clarifying overrides.
16
 
Christiansen and Eskridge also observe that there was often a delay of 
several years before courts first flagged a precedent as having been 
superseded by statute, and that relying on court-based signals yielded high 
numbers of false positives (that is, cases in which courts suggested a 
precedent had been superseded or otherwise affected by a statutory 
amendment but that Christiansen and Eskridge concluded were not 
overrides).
17
  They mention these facts only in passing while showing how 
they correct for them, but I argue that these findings are important in 
themselves.  Courts, ultimately, are the primary audience for overrides
18—
and these findings suggest deep-set confusion over how to integrate overrides 
into a judicial system that prioritizes adherence to precedent.  Again, original 
 
14. See discussion infra subpart II(A). 
15. Hasen, supra note 13, at 259 (“Identifying congressional overrides is a challenge, as there is 
no single repository of such information.”). 
16. See discussion infra subpart II(B). 
17. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1329 n.48, 1342–43. 
18. See id. at 1358–59 (explaining that the Supreme Court and Congress do not communicate 
directly but rather through “judicial decisions and congressional responses, both codifications and 
overrides”). 
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analysis of Christiansen and Eskridge’s data reveals important patterns: 
courts generally flag restorative overrides far more quickly than they flag 
updating or clarifying overrides, even though one would assume that they 
would be more likely to resist restorative overrides than updating or 
clarifying overrides.
19
  In other words, although political-science literature 
has framed overrides primarily as part of an interbranch policy struggle,
20
 
this finding suggests that slow implementation may often stem from 
information failure rather than wilful resistance.
21
  To put it simply, overrides 
cannot do their work if courts do not know that a prior decision has been 
overridden. 
Accordingly, I argue that an important first step in making overrides 
more effective would be for Congress simply to state—clearly in statutory 
text, as well as in any committee reports—that it is enacting an override.22  
The data suggests this would particularly helpful in raising awareness of 
updating and clarifying overrides. It would make it far easier for relevant 
congressional offices, administrative agencies, future researchers, and legal 
search engines such as Westlaw and Lexis to maintain and update a relatively 
comprehensive list of overrides and thus help ensure that courts can promptly 
integrate overrides into their analysis.  Or, more generally, offices within 
Congress or administrative agencies could take on the responsibility of 
systematically identifying overrides and disseminating information about 
them.  These suggestions supplement the drafting proposals, largely designed 
to make restorative overrides more effective, that Christiansen and Eskridge 
put forward, which I also heartily endorse (indeed, some build explicitly on 
proposals I have made in my own prior writing in this area).
23
  I end, 
however, with a note of caution.  Christiansen and Eskridge report that 
women and minority groups have been surprisingly successful at obtaining 
overrides of narrow interpretations of civil rights laws, a phenomenon that 
they dub an “inversion of Carolene Products.”24  This is an important insight, 
but it also important to acknowledge a fact that Christiansen and Eskridge do 
not highlight: courts retain the ultimate trump card in this particular dialogue, 
 
19. See discussion infra subpart II(C). 
20. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1458 (discussing political-science literature on 
overrides); see also Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: 
Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 522–23 (2009) 
(same). 
21. See discussion infra subpart II(C), Part III. 
22. See discussion infra subpart IV(A). 
23. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1442–44 (citing Deborah A. Widiss, 
Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEXAS 
L. REV. 859 (2012)); see also generally Widiss, supra note 20. 
24. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1381 (referring to United States v. Carolene 
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1937)). 
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in that they have often held that more expansive understandings of equality 
that Congress seeks to implement are unconstitutional.
25
 
II. Identifying the Overrides 
A. Congressional-Focused Strategies Versus Judicial-Focused Strategies 
Both Professor Hasen and Professor Eskridge and Mr. Christiansen 
began with Eskridge’s foundational 1991 study, generally considered the 
leading empirical study of overrides (prior to the publication of these two 
new studies).  In the 1991 study, Eskridge defined an override as anytime 
Congress “reacts consciously to, and modifies a statutory interpretation 
decision” such that similar cases in the future would be “decided 
differently.”26  The 1991 study stated that, “[w]ith only a few exceptions,” it 
did not include as overrides statutes for which the “legislative history—
mainly committee reports and hearings—d[id] not reveal a legislative focus 
on judicial decisions.”27  In other words, it largely excluded “implicit” 
overrides, in which a new statute may affect the viability of a prior statutory 
interpretation precedent but Congress may not realize it is doing so. 
To identify the overrides for the 1991 study, Eskridge and his research 
assistants searched all committee reports printed in U.S.C.C.A.N. for the 
relevant time period, noting every reference to judicial interpretations that the 
reports described as being “‘overruled,’ ‘modified,’ or ‘clarified’ by a 
provision in the proposed statute,” and then “weeding out” provisions that 
were not enacted or that Eskridge determined did not override a decision in a 
“substantial way.”28  Recognizing that (even then) not all laws generated 
committee reports and not all committee reports are reported in 
U.S.C.C.A.N., Eskridge also reviewed additional reports, hearing transcripts, 
and secondary sources.
29
  This generated a list of 121 Supreme Court 
decisions overridden by subsequent statutory provisions enacted between 
1967 and 1990.
30
 
 
25. See discussion infra subpart IV(B). 
26. See Eskridge, supra note 3, at 332 n.1 (emphasis added). 
27. Id.; see also id. at 419 & n.308 (explaining that a “few” overrides were included even absent 
legislative history on point where the “relevant communities of interpretation” “clearly linked” the 
new statute to a Supreme Court case). 
28. Id. at 418.  For an argument that even statements in legislative history criticizing a prior 
judicial interpretation should sometimes lead to reconsideration of settled precedent, see James J. 
Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or 
Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1994), and James J. Brudney, Distrust and Clarify: 
Appreciating Congressional Overrides, 90 TEXAS L. REV. SEE ALSO 205 (2012) (arguing that 
courts should pay particular attention to legislative history accompanying overrides). 
29. See Eskridge, supra note 3, at 418. 
30. See id. at 338.  The 1991 Eskridge study also included 220 overridden lower court decisions. 
Id.  In the years after Eskridge’s pioneering study, various other researchers have employed his 
methodology to update it and check it for completeness.  See, e.g., JEB BARNES, OVERRULED? 
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Hasen explicitly framed his new study as an updating of Eskridge’s 1991 
study, and, to permit an “apples-to-apples comparison,” he used largely the 
same methodology as Eskridge’s 1991 study.31  That is, he searched 
committee reports on Westlaw, using the USCCAN-REP database, looking 
for any reports or other materials that included words such as “overruled” or 
“modified” close to a mention of the Supreme Court and, for a subset of the 
years he studied, simply looking for any mention of the Supreme Court at 
all.
32
  He recognized that committee reports appeared “less likely than twenty 
years ago” to mention an override and accordingly supplemented this search 
with secondary sources that identified additional overrides.
33
  Although he 
did not require that the legislative history mention the override, he also did 
not include any statutes that “implicitly overruled a Supreme Court statutory 
interpretation decision.”34  In total, this generated a list of 46 Supreme Court 
decisions that had been overridden since 1991,
35
 and it showed a significant 
decline in override activity that began early in the 1990s and slowed to a 
trickle in recent years.
36
 
In their new study, Christiansen and Eskridge assert that Professor 
Hasen’s data set was artificially deflated not (primarily) by the absence of 
overrides but rather by the absence of references in legislative history to 
overrides, an artifact of the decline in the use of legislative history more 
generally.
37
  To address this potential shortcoming, they and their research 
assistants engaged in an extraordinarily labor-intensive process to 
supplement the results that the committee report search uncovered.  First, 
they identified every Supreme Court decision during the relevant time period. 
Then, they used Westlaw to identify all cases in which a lower court 
decision, or other legal document, flagged the case as having been affected 
by a subsequent statutory enactment.  They then followed up on all such 
leads, reading the case and the later legislation to determine whether the 
legislation met their criteria for an override.
38
 
 
LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES, PLURALISM, AND CONTEMPORARY COURT-CONGRESS RELATIONS 77 
(2004) (discussing how the author independently researched congressional reports and the 
Congressional Record for a specific year and did not identify any overrides that had been included 
in the 1991 Eskridge study); Lori Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Behind the Scenes: The Supreme 
Court and Congress in Statutory Interpretation, in GREAT THEATER: THE AMERICAN CONGRESS IN 
THE 1990S, at 224, 225 n.1, 227 (Herbert F. Weisberg & Samuel C. Patterson eds., 1998) (using 
Eskridge’s framework but extending analysis through 1996). 
31. See Hasen, supra note 13, at 217. 
32. See id. app. IV at 259–61. 
33. Id. app. IV at 259. 
34. Id. The methodological index does not indicate what other markers of Congressional intent 
were used to make this distinction. 
35. See id. app. I at 252–55 (listing all overrides). 
36. See id. at 218. 
37. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1327–29. 
38. See id. at 1328–29. 
2014] Response 151 
 
 
 
In total, Christiansen and Eskridge compiled a list of 286 statutory 
provisions overriding 275 Supreme Court decisions, including 122 since 
1991.
39
  Notably, employing the Westlaw supplementary approach also 
expanded the list of overrides of Supreme Court decisions for the earlier time 
period that was the focus of the Eskridge 1991 study from 121 to 164 
overrides.
40
  Thus, the bottom-line results of the Christiansen and Eskridge 
study differed sharply from those of the Hasen study, especially for overrides 
enacted during the 1990s.  Whereas Hasen found a sharp decline in override 
activity during that decade,
41
 Christiansen and Eskridge declared the 1990s 
the “golden age of overrides.”42  Christiansen and Eskridge found overrides 
began to drop off after 1999, although they did not find as complete a decline 
as Hasen reported.
43
 
Christiansen and Eskridge characterize their use of Westlaw primarily as 
a mechanism to respond to the “diminished value of committee reports” since 
1990.
44
  This seems to me to be a reasonable strategy, but it is important to 
highlight the extent to which this shift is more than simply gap filling. By 
moving from reliance on primarily committee reports, or other Congressional 
materials such as hearing transcripts, to lower court flags, Christiansen and 
Eskridge move from a Congressional-focused vehicle for identifying 
overrides to a judicial-focused vehicle for identifying overrides (mediated, as 
discussed below, through Westlaw’s coding conventions).  In so doing, they 
also move from an ex ante focus—that is, what was understood as the intent 
prior to enacting the override—to an ex post focus—that is, how has the 
override been interpreted.  
Importantly, after using the Westlaw mechanism to identify overrides, 
Christiansen and Eskridge reviewed the congressional hearings and 
committee reports on each bill that included an override and found that in a 
high percentage (approximately 85%) there was at least some explicit 
mention of either the override provision or the problems with the Supreme 
Court decision subsequently overridden.
45
 This suggests that at least some 
congressional drafters were likely aware of the interaction between the bill 
language and the prior precedent for many of the overrides. Nonetheless, 
since hearing testimony is far less central to the legislative process than 
 
39. Id. at 1329; see id. app. 1. 
40. Id. at 1328–29, app. 1.  They also removed a few statutes that had been classified as 
overrides in the initial 1991 study after determining, upon further consideration, that they were not 
overrides. 
41. Hasen concluded that there was an overage of 5.8 overrides during 1991–2000, and that this 
was heavily skewed by inclusion of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which (by his count) overrode 10 
Supreme Court cases. See Hasen, supra note 13, at 209, 218. 
42. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1336–40. 
43. Id. at 1340–42. 
44. Id. at 1328. 
45. See id. at 1534, app. 3 (describing criteria).  Analysis of data available upon request. 
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committee reports,
46
 it is likely that these connections were less prominent—
and sometimes entirely ignored—in debate or discussion over bills in which 
an override was mentioned in a hearing but not referenced in the committee 
report or legislative language. And, notably, there were several bills in which 
the overrides were not mentioned even in the hearings.  Thus, in moving to 
the Westlaw approach, Christiansen and Eskridge most likely lose at least to 
some extent a distinction that the Eskridge 1991 study and Hasen both 
emphasized, between statutory amendments in which Congress “consciously 
intends” to enact an override and statutory amendments that might 
“implicitly” supersede a prior decision.47 
B. Classifying Overrides: Updating, Clarifying, and Restorative 
Christiansen and Eskridge then further categorize the overrides into three 
different “kinds” of overrides: updating, clarifying, and restorative.48  
Although the political science literature, and many in the legal academy 
(myself included), have focused on the interbranch struggles implicit in 
Congress “challenging” the Court on contested policy matters through the 
enactment of overrides, the picture of overrides that emerges from this new 
study is much more nuanced.  Christiansen and Eskridge conclude that 
approximately two-thirds of overrides are “updating” overrides, in which 
Congress did not express “negative judgment” about the Court’s 
interpretation but merely replaced an older interpretation with a new rule that 
is better suited for the modern regulatory state.
49
  Many of these overrides 
were in some sense incidental to more general overhauls of a given statutory 
scheme, such as the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 or the Judicial 
 
46. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside: 
An Empirical Look Study of Legislative Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons, 95 STAN. L. REV. 
901,  972–73, 977 (2013) (surveying congressional staff, finding that committee reports play the 
central role in educating members and staff about proposed legislation and that reports are 
considered far more reliable than hearing transcripts).  
47. Of course, some judges and commentators would dispute the premise that Congress, a 
collection of 535 independent legislators, can have a specific intent at all, but I agree with 
commentators who argue that one can ascribe “group intent” to Congress.  See LAWRENCE M. 
SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION 82–83 (2010) (noting 
“we routinely attribute intent to a group of people based on the intent of a subset of that group, 
provided that there is agreement in advance about what role the subgroup will play”); Stephen 
Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 864–65 
(1992) (acknowledging that “ascribing purposes to groups and institutions is a complex business, 
and one that is often difficult to describe abstractly[,]” but arguing “that fact does not make such 
ascriptions improper[,]” and explicitly endorsing ascribing group intent to Congress). 
48. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1370–75.  Hasen classifies overrides 
differently into “technical”, “bipartisan”, and “partisan”, see Hasen, supra note 13, at 219, and finds 
a particularly steep drop off for bipartisan overrides.  Id. at 237–38.  Hasen’s bipartisan category 
seems likely to overlap with Christiansen and Eskridge’s updating and clarifying categories, which 
they also concluded had fallen off sharply.  Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1368–69. 
49. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1370. 
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Improvements Act of 1990.
50
  They conclude that an additional group of 
overrides, about 10% of the total, are “clarifying,” where the primary 
justification was responding to confusion in the law.
51
 
Accordingly, it is a relatively small subset of the total population of 
overrides—approximately one-fifth—that Christiansen and Eskridge classify 
as “restorative” overrides, where Congress repudiated the prior Court 
interpretation as a flawed interpretation of the pre-existing law and 
“restored” the status quo ante.52  These overrides disproportionately involved 
civil rights and antidiscrimination statutes where partisan divides tend to run 
deep,
53
 although even here, most of the overrides were at least somewhat 
bipartisan and several were signed into law by conservative Republican 
presidents.
54
   Notably, as Hasen highlights, this includes two relatively 
recent overrides: the ADA Amendments Act, passed in 2008, and a 
reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act, enacted in 2006.
55
  In other words, 
well into the period of divided government, Congress could still put together 
bipartisan majorities to override unduly restrictive interpretations of civil 
rights legislation. 
One potential limitation of this classification approach is that it takes 
Congress’s word, primarily as expressed in committee reports, for the nature 
of an override—when Congress may have political reasons for how it 
characterizes an override that depart from the substantive reality of the 
override.
56
  That said, the classification of overrides—and the striking finding 
 
50. Id. at 1370–71. 
51. Id. at 1373–74. 
52. Id. at 1374. 
53. Id. at 1375. 
54. Id. at 1375. 
55. Hasen, supra note 13, at 220. That said, Hasen also emphasizes that Congress was 
deliberately ambiguous in the VRA’s override of a prior Supreme Court decision so that the bill 
could garner a bipartisan majority.  See id. at 221 (citing Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls 
of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 218 (2007)). 
56. For example, one of the court decisions that Congress responded to in the 1991 Civil Rights 
Act—a massive bill that included at least 12 overrides—was Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228 (1989), a decision concerning the causation standard applied in employment discrimination 
cases.  See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1353–54 n.155.  Price Waterhouse was a 
splintered decision, with a plurality opinion, two concurrences, and a dissent.  The bill that became 
the 1991 Civil Rights Act was referred jointly to the House Education and Labor Committee and the 
House Judiciary Committee.  The Education and Labor committee report titles its discussion of the 
response to the case “The Need to Overturn Price Waterhouse,” emphasizes that the Supreme 
Court’s decision departed from the interpretation adopted by numerous circuit courts, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, and the Justice Department, and states that it “severely 
undercut” the “effectiveness” of Title VII.  H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. I, at 45–46 (1991), reprinted 
in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 583 (emphasis added).  Christiansen and Eskridge thus (reasonably) 
classify the override as “restorative.”  See Christiansen and Eskridge, supra note 1, app. 1 at 1493. 
Interestingly, however, the House Judiciary Committee report (discussing the same proposed 
language, which is also very similar to the language ultimately adopted), while also critical of the 
Supreme Court decision and noting that it departed from the interpretation adopted by several 
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that a significant majority are updating or clarifying overrides rather than 
restorative overrides—is a dramatic advance in our understanding of 
overrides.  Broadly speaking, the political science literature has framed 
overrides as a check on the extent which the Court can implement its own 
political objectives.
57
   Legal scholars, by contrast, have typically described 
overrides as part of a “colloquy” between courts and legislators, in which 
courts welcome “corrections” from Congress.58  The new taxonomy that 
Christiansen and Eskridge develop in this article suggests that these 
competing characterizations are probably both too broad-brush.  It may be, 
for example, that updating and clarifying overrides typically function as a 
productive colloquy between courts and Congress, whereas restorative are 
often a power struggle.  Thus, one of the primary takeaways from this new 
study is that empirical work on, and theoretical explorations of, overrides 
needs to be sensitive to these nuances. 
In fact, I did original analysis of Christiansen and Eskridge’s data,59 
using their distinction between restorative and non-restorative overrides to 
 
appellate courts, titled its discussion of the response to the case “Clarifying [the] Prohibition 
Against Impermissible Consideration of Race, Color, Religion, Sex or National Origin in 
Employment Practices,” and states that Section 5 “overturns one aspect of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Price Waterhouse.”  H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. II, at 16 (1991), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 709 (emphasis added).  In fact, there was significant debate more generally over 
whether the 1991 Act would state that its purpose was “restoring” or that its purpose was 
“expanding” civil rights protections; a word choice that was thought to be important for determining 
whether the overrides would be applied retroactively.  See Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 
U.S. 298, 307–08 (1994); Widiss, supra note 20, at 540–541.  As far as the response to Price 
Waterhouse went, although the substance of the override replaced an affirmative defense on liability 
with a limitation on remedies, the practical effect of the override was in many respects identical to 
the standard adopted by the plurality and Justice White’s concurrence in Price Waterhouse.  See 
Widiss, supra note 23, at 883, 885, 902–04 (discussing the override and prior judicial interpretations 
in more detail).  Indeed, in a recent Supreme Court decision, several of the justices emphasized the 
extent to which the 1991 Act’s response “endorsed the [Price Waterhouse] plurality’s conclusion” 
regarding what kind of claims were actionable and merely “supersed[ed] Price Waterhouse in part.” 
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2539 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added); see also Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 185 (2009) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (stating that “Congress ratified Price Waterhouse’s interpretation of the plaintiff’s 
burden of proof” in the 1991 Act) (emphasis added).  My point here is not that there is anything 
inherently incorrect in classifying the Price Waterhouse response as a restorative override—I would 
do the same myself—but to emphasize the extent to which it also could plausibly be called a 
clarifying override or even (in many respects at least) a codification.  See also Christiansen & 
Eskridge, supra note 1, app. 3 at 1535 (discussing how they coded the reasons for the override of 
Price Waterhouse).  The broader point is that these lines are fuzzy and subject to manipulation for 
the sake of political or doctrinal arguments. 
57. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1458 (noting that most of the major political-
science models “assume the Supreme Court is primarily a strategic actor, seeking to impose its 
political and institutional preferences onto statutes and avoiding overrides through crafty dodges”). 
58. See id. at 1458–59 (describing the most popular legal model’s notion of Congress as the 
“principal” and the Court as the “faithful agent” carrying out the directives that have been legally 
enacted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
59. Again, I am grateful to them for their willingness to share their data with me. 
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look back at Hasen’s findings, and I discovered an interesting pattern.  As 
noted above, Hasen’s study included only 46 Supreme Court decisions 
overridden since 1991 (including 5 that were not included in Christiansen 
and Eskridge’s list),60 while the Christiansen and Eskridge study includes 
122 for the same time period.  Thus, on average, Hasen’s study included only 
34% of the overrides included in Christiansen and Eskridge’s list.  But these 
differences were not evenly distributed.  Hasen’s methodology identified a 
far higher percentage of the overrides that Christensen and Eskridge 
classified as restorative than the overrides they classified as updating or 
clarifying. To be specific, looking only at the overlapping years, Hasen 
included 73% of the overrides coded as restorative in the Christiansen and 
Eskridge study, while only 17% of the non-restorative (that is, updating and 
clarifying) overrides. A similar pattern appears when considering 
Christiansen and Eskridge’s depth variable, a variable that is highly 
correlated with restorative overrides.
61
  Hasen included 7% of the overrides 
coded as depth “1” or “2”; 35% of the overrides coded as depth “3”; and 67% 
of the overrides coded as depth “4”, where increasing numbers indicate 
“deeper” overrides—that is, overrides that disapprove not only of a specific 
result but also of the reasoning employed to reach that result.
62
 
Hasen’s override database thus differed significantly from Christiansen 
and Eskridge’s as to the kind of override included, as well as to the overall 
number of overrides included.  Accordingly, one possible conclusion is that 
ex ante committee-report-focused research, as supplemented by secondary 
sources, does a relatively good job of identifying “restorative” overrides and 
“deep” overrides (which are themselves heavily overlapping categories), 
whereas the ex post Westlaw-based research captures far more of the 
interplay between large-scale reorganizations of statutory law and existing 
precedents.  This raises interesting questions that future researchers may wish 
to explore: Does Congress even “know” the range of statutory precedents 
that might be affected by significant restructurings of the statutory law?  And 
if it doesn’t, what effect, if any, should that fact have on subsequent 
interpretation of an override? 
C. False Positives, False Negatives, and Delay 
Both Professor Hasen and Professor Eskridge and Mr. Christiansen 
forthrightly admit that neither research methodology—that is, the legislative-
 
60. See, e.g., Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1353–54  n.155 (discussing Christiansen 
and Eskridge’s rationale for excluding certain decisions that are included in Hasen’s study). 
61. Analysis available upon request. 
62. Analysis available upon request. I combined cases coded by Christiansen and Eskridge as 
having a depth of “1” or “2” to create a reasonably-sized sample.  I did not report results in the text 
for overrides coded as “0” or “5” because there were only two of each.  Hasen did not include any 
of the depth “0” or “5” overrides. 
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history-focused strategy or the judicial-citation-focused strategy—is 
infallible.
63
  The legislative-history approach generates “false positives” in 
the form of disapproving mentions of Supreme Court decisions in committee 
reports for bills that are not actually enacted, and characterizations of bills as 
disagreeing with a prior judicial interpretation, where further consideration of 
the enacted language suggests a codification. And it generates “false 
negatives,” in that it fails to identify some statutory amendments that are 
clearly overrides.  As Hasen observes, the committee-report method failed to 
capture a law explicitly titled “The Reversal of Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett 
Act.”64  More generally, as described above, Christiansen and Eskridge 
concluded that the Westlaw identification system uncovered significantly 
more overrides than the legislative-history-focused strategy. 
But the Westlaw identification strategy was also very inaccurate. 
Christiansen and Eskridge little discuss the import of these findings beyond 
noting that they and their research assistants independently assessed the 
statutory language and prior precedent to correct for them.  My objective 
here is not to question the accuracy of this process of sorting the wheat from 
the chaff, but rather to highlight how the false positives, false negatives, and 
delay they observed have important implications for assessing the efficacy of 
overrides. 
First, the Westlaw identification strategy generated a lot of false 
positives. Christiansen and Eskridge identified every decision issued by the 
Supreme Court during the relevant time period and followed up on any 
Westlaw flags that indicated that the precedent had been affected by 
subsequent legislation.  But many of these leads did not pan out.  In their 
words, they found that “about half the time, they were not overrides.”65  This 
means that courts are frequently flagging precedents as “superseded by 
statute,” “abrogated by statute,” or “called into doubt by statute” that careful 
review suggests did not qualify as overrides under the definition Christiansen 
and Eskridge employed.
66
 
In part, this may reflect the simple point that, as noted above, “override” 
is in some sense a term of art.  In some instances, courts—and researchers—
 
63. See Hasen, supra note 13, at 260 (asserting that his research methods revealed most major 
overrides, but nonetheless undoubtedly missed some); see also Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 
1, at 1325 (asserting that they identified a more comprehensive list of statutory overrides than any 
previous study, but that they “surely . . . missed a few”).  
64. Hasen, supra note 13, app. IV at 260 n.3. 
65. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1328. 
66. In an email exchange with Christiansen, I asked how frequent these false positives were and 
whether they were more frequent when the flag indicated “called into doubt by statute” rather than 
stronger signals such as “superseded by statute” or “abrogated by statute.”  He explained to me that 
they had not kept records of all of the false positives.  He thought, however, that there was a higher 
percentage of false positives for the “called into doubt” flags but that there were “an awful lot” of 
false positives for each of the Westlaw signals.  E-mail from Matthew Christiansen, Yale Law 
School, to author (Aug. 29, 2013, 11:06 EST) (on file with author). 
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can legitimately disagree about whether an amendment is an override.
67
 It 
may also reflect impreciseness in the coding protocol employed by Westlaw. 
Coders need to translate a court’s description of the interaction between 
precedent and statutes into a limited number of flags.  This is a complex and 
nuanced interplay and sometimes the Westlaw researchers may not properly 
code the import of the court’s discussion.  But most importantly, it likely 
reflects some real confusion on the part of lower courts about how statutory 
amendments interact with precedent. 
The Westlaw identification system is also slow.  Christiansen and 
Eskridge report that, on average, it takes six years after an override is enacted 
before the precedent it addresses is first flagged by a lower court as 
potentially superseded, although the average delay for overrides enacted in 
the 100th and later Congresses (that is, 1987 and later) decreased to just 
under four years.
68
  Christiansen and Eskridge suggest, reasonably, that the 
decreased lag time likely reflects the increased availability of electronic 
search tools.  If this is correct, it seems likely that the lag time will continue 
to diminish as search tools become more refined and affordable.  But it will 
likely continue to take several years for some precedents to be flagged. 
During the later time period (that is, 100th through 112th Congresses, 1987–
2012), they report that nearly three-quarters of the overrides—already 
flagged on Westlaw—were identified within five years.69  But Christiansen 
and Eskridge do not explicitly state the corollary, which I think is perhaps 
more important: that more than 25% of the overrides ultimately identified 
were not flagged by any lower court (or at least not identified in Westlaw as 
flagged by any lower court) within the first five years after the override.  
And finally, the Westlaw identification system is incomplete, or, to put it 
in social science language, it also generates false negatives—that is, older 
precedents that should be flagged as superseded but that appear, on Westlaw 
at least, as fully binding precedent.  For more recent Congresses, this may 
simply reflect the time lag.  Christiansen and Eskridge explain that for the 
106th through 112th Congresses (1999–2012), about a third of the overrides 
they identified through other research tools had not yet been flagged on 
Westlaw, while only 10% of the overrides from the 100th through the 105th 
(1987–1998) had not yet been flagged.70  But it is again important to 
emphasize the flip of this observation: even fifteen years after an override has 
been enacted, one out of ten decisions identified by Christiansen and 
Eskridge as having been overridden have never been indicated as such by 
lower courts.  In total, Christiansen and Eskridge report that 56 out of the 
total of 275 Supreme Court cases in their data set have not (yet) been flagged 
 
67 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 60.  
68. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1343. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
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by lower courts as superseded or otherwise affected by later statutory 
enactments.
71
 
These findings may actually understate the problem, in that the 
Christiansen and Eskridge study focuses only on Supreme Court decisions 
that have been overridden.  It is not uncommon, however, for Congress to 
supersede lower court decisions.  In Professor Eskridge’s 1991 study, where 
he sought to identify all Supreme Court and lower court decisions that had 
been overridden from 1967 to 1990, roughly two thirds of his total data set 
were lower court decisions.
72
   Subject-specific studies of overrides, such as a 
study that sought to identify all bankruptcy decisions that had been 
overridden, likewise identify numerous lower court decisions.
73
 
It seems quite possible that lower courts would miss overrides of earlier 
lower court decisions more frequently than they would miss overrides of 
Supreme Court decisions, simply because Supreme Court decisions generally 
receive more attention and because Congressional overrides of Supreme 
Court decisions also probably receive more attention.  If future research were 
to confirm that this is the case, this would suggest that the delay and the 
problem of “false negatives” is even greater than that suggested by 
Christiansen and Eskridge’s current study—that is, that probably far more 
than 10% of all overrides may never be flagged by lower courts as 
overridden.  Additionally, putting together these two observations—that the 
committee-report identification process is incomplete and that the Westlaw 
identification process is also incomplete—suggests that there are almost 
certainly at least a few overrides that have been enacted that are not captured 
through either mechanism (or the various supplementary mechanisms the 
researchers employed). 
Christiansen and Eskridge do not further disaggregate these findings, but 
I was curious as to whether these lag times and the failure to flag at all varied 
according to the “kind” of override enacted.  Accordingly, I ran some 
additional analysis using the data that Christiansen and Eskridge compiled.  
Recall that Christiansen and Eskridge found that it took, on average, just 
under four years for overrides enacted by the 100th or later Congress (1987 
or later) to be flagged.
74
  Breaking down these results by type of override 
shows striking differences.
75
  The lag time for most restorative overrides was 
extraordinarily short.  The mean lag time was 2.57 years, but the median lag 
 
71. Id. at 1343 n.128. 
72. See Eskridge, supra note 3, at 338. 
73. See Daniel J. Bussel, Textualism’s Failures: A Study of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions, 53 
VAND. L. REV. 887 (2000). 
74. See supra text accompanying note 68. 
75. Like Christiansen and Eskridge in their analysis of lag time, I excluded all overrides that 
have not yet been flagged by lower courts, obviously skewing the time frame for “recognition” 
shorter, since some have still not been recognized. 
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time was only 0.32 years—in other words, 50% of restorative overrides are 
flagged by a lower court on Westlaw in less than four months.
76
  The picture 
looks dramatically different when considering the overrides that Christiansen 
and Eskridge classify as non-restorative.  For these updating or clarifying 
overrides, the mean was 4.23 years and the median was 2.08 years, that is, 
more than six times longer than the median for restorative.  Moreover, a true 
measure of the “lag time” for flagging non-restorative overrides would be 
even longer—and the gap with restorative even greater—because a higher 
percentage of the non-restorative overrides have not been flagged on 
Westlaw at all, and thus were excluded entirely from the averages.
77
 This 
suggests, as I discuss more fully below, that there are significant information 
failures in implementing updating or clarifying overrides, or at least that 
courts do not routinely flag their effect on prior precedents. This finding is 
particularly striking because one would expect courts to be far less resistant 
to implementing updating and clarifying overrides than to implementing 
restorative overrides. 
If Westlaw were only a mechanism to identify overrides in a “research” 
sense, this combination of false positives, delay, and false negatives would 
simply go to the accuracy of the data set.  Some amount of play at the edges 
is common in any quantitative study that analyzes developments in the real 
world rather than the controlled world of a laboratory.  But at a fundamental 
level, the Westlaw identification system is itself a marker of the efficacy of 
overrides.  That is, one of Westlaw’s (and Lexis’s) primary services is that it 
flags when subsequent developments affect the reliability of prior precedent. 
The evidence above suggests that there are deep-rooted problems in the 
reliability with which Westlaw (and likely Lexis) handle overrides, and/or 
the reliability of the way lower courts handle overrides, problems that are 
explored more fully below. 
D. Westlaw and Lexis Coding Conventions Regarding Overrides 
In developing my own study of overridden precedents, I sought to gain a 
working understanding of how and when Westlaw’s Keycite service and 
Lexis’s Shepard’s service flag precedents as having been overridden.78  In 
many respects, the processes are broadly similar, although the “top-level” 
signals typically employed by the two services to overrides differ 
considerably, as discussed below.  
 
76. Analysis available upon request.  
77. Looking at overrides that occurred in 1987 or later, 93% of the restorative overrides have 
been identified on Westlaw, but only 82% of the non-restorative overrides.  Analysis available upon 
request.  
78. To gain this information, I corresponded via email and spoke with representatives of each 
company.  Copies of the emails and my notes from these conversations are available upon request. 
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Both Westlaw and Lexis rely primarily on signals from courts to make 
determinations about the reliability of prior precedent.  Within a purely 
caselaw-based system, this approach makes good sense.  Lower courts 
cannot overrule binding precedent by a higher court, so in most instances a 
decision will remain binding until a court at the same level says that it is no 
longer binding.  This is an oversimplification, in that the Supreme Court, at 
least, is often somewhat obscure about the extent to which it is overruling a 
prior precedent.
79
   Nonetheless, lower courts generally may safely wait for 
clear signals from higher courts before disregarding otherwise binding 
precedent. 
The interaction of statutes and case law is necessarily more complicated.  
Of course, it is clear that as a formal matter, Congress has the power to 
supersede prior judicial interpretation of statutes.
80
  Westlaw, however, 
generally will not flag in any way that statutory language calls into question 
the validity of a precedent until a lower court makes a statement to this effect 
in an opinion.  Any such indications by lower courts flip the “flag” on the 
prior precedent to “yellow” rather than “red”. (These are the flags that 
Christiansen and Eskridge used to identify potential overrides.) Given the 
number of false-positives that Christiansen and Eskridge identified, this is a 
reasonable decision by those who designed the Westlaw coding protocol. But 
for a very significant number of cases, it incorrectly signals that a case is still 
“good law” when in fact it has been overridden, at least in part. This problem 
is particularly acute under the “Westlaw Classic” search mechanism that is 
currently being phased out but that, until quite recently, was widely used.
81
  
On the newer Westlaw Next system, the flag is “yellow” but it is also 
accompanied by specific textual phrases indicating the nature of the warning 
(e.g., “superseded by statute” as opposed to “distinguished by”).  On 
Westlaw Classic, by contrast, the flag is yellow and the textual signal is a 
generic signal assigned to all yellow flags, the vast majority of which simply 
signal that some later decision has distinguished the earlier decision: “Some 
negative history but not overruled.” 
Westlaw generally will “red” flag a Supreme Court case only when the 
Supreme Court itself clearly indicates that Congress’s subsequent action 
superseded the prior precedent.  This is a significant bar.  The Supreme Court 
decides relatively few cases in any given year, so it may take many years 
 
79. See generally, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular 
Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1 (2010) (collecting examples of this phenomenon 
and discussing its significance). 
80. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 
GEO. L.J. 281, 283–94 (1989) (describing “strong” and “weak” conceptions of supremacy). 
81. According to Thomson Reuters’s second quarter 2013 report, 80% of Westlaw revenue had 
been converted to WestlawNext.  Press Release, Thomson Reuters, Thomson Reuters Reports 
Second-Quarter 2013 Results (July 30, 2013), available at http://thomsonreuters.com/press-
releases/072013/thomson-reuters-reports-second-quarter-2013-results. 
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before it decides a case in which it would naturally cite an overridden case. 
But even when the Supreme Court does cite an overridden case, it frequently 
does not indicate in any way that the precedent has been superseded.
82
  And 
if this occurs, Westlaw will not change the color of the flag to red. The only 
other way in which, pursuant to its coding protocol, Westlaw will assign a 
“red” flag to the overridden case is if Congress clearly indicates in statutory 
language that a new law superseded a prior judicial interpretation.
83
  
Congress, however, rarely does this—although, as discussed below, it 
should. 
The effects of Westlaw’s cautious approach to “red” flagging overridden 
precedents are quite dramatic.  As noted above, most of the cases 
Christiansen and Eskridge identified as having been overridden are 
eventually flagged by some lower court as potentially superseded.  But very 
few have actually been “red flagged” by Westlaw.  In my independent 
analysis of a subset of the Christiansen/Eskridge data containing overrides 
between 1985 and 2011,
84
 I found that only 33 out of 166, or 20%, currently 
have “red” flags on Westlaw.  On Lexis, by contrast, 79% bear Lexis’s “red 
circle” warning signal, because Lexis generally changes the signal as soon as 
a lower court indicates that a prior precedent has been superseded.  This, 
however, may cause the opposite problem of overstating the effects of some 
 
82. For example, Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994)—a case that relied on plain-meaning 
and whole-text analysis to disregard a long-standing agency interpretation—was overridden just two 
years after it was decided (almost twenty years ago now).  See Act of Sept. 26, 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-204, 110 Stat. 2874, 2927 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 501).  Nonetheless, as of March 13, 2014, 
the Supreme Court has cited Brown sixteen times without ever indicating that it was overridden, and 
accordingly Brown is still “yellow-flagged” on Westlaw.  The Court has never cited the case for the 
specific substantive interpretation that was overridden, but it often cites Brown for statutory 
interpretation principles where the fact that the case was subsequently overridden is arguably 
relevant to the validity or persuasiveness of the interpretive principle.  See, e.g., Mohamad v. 
Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1708 (2012) (quoting Brown for the proposition that “there is a 
presumption that a given term is used to mean the same thing throughout a statute, a presumption 
surely at its most vigorous when a term is repeated within a given sentence”); Lexecon Inc. v. 
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (quoting Brown for the 
proposition that “Age [of an agency’s interpretation] is no antidote to clear inconsistency with a 
statute”). 
83. Westlaw is not consistent in applying red flags even when statutory language specifically 
disapproves of a Supreme Court decision.  For example, the Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and 
Amendments Act of 2006 included among its findings a statement that “effectiveness of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 has been significantly weakened by the United States Supreme Court decisions 
in Reno v. Bossier Parish II and Georgia v. Ashcroft, which have misconstrued Congress’ original 
intent in enacting the Voting Rights Act of 1965,” and Section 5 of the 2006 Act overrode the 
interpretation at issue in those cases by amending the relevant language (although in a rather 
obscure manner). See Pub. L. No. 109-246, §§ 2(b)(6), 5, 120 Stat. 577, 578, 580–81 (2006) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb-1).  But Westlaw (as of February 27, 2014) does not red flag 
either case. 
84. This data set contains all overrides included in the Christiansen and Eskridge data set that 
occurred between 1985 and 2011, except for the few cases overridden in that window that were 
decided before 1946 and a few overrides that addressed cases that had already been overridden.  
This limitation excluded 12 overrides, out of a total of 178 overrides.  
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subsequent statutory amendments, since Christiansen and Eskridge’s 
research found a high level of “false positives”, that is, warnings by lower 
courts that a given precedent had been superseded that Christiansen and 
Eskridge ultimately found was not an override. The bottom line is that 
neither Lexis’s nor Westlaw’s signals with respect to overrides are very 
reliable. 
III. After the Override 
My own prior work in the area has focused on judicial interpretations of 
overrides in the employment discrimination context, most of which were 
restorative overrides (often implementing an interpretation that had been 
urged by a passionate dissent in the Supreme Court decision).  I have argued 
that courts often interpret such overrides unduly narrowly,
85
 and improperly 
refuse to reinterpret identical language in related statutes.
86
   Christiansen and 
Eskridge agree that this is a recurring and important issue.
87
  That said, 
Christiansen and Eskridge’s overall findings suggest that these problems may 
not be generally representative of overrides (although, as discussed below, 
these findings are quite different from those of the other relatively large scale 
effort to explore empirically the effects of overrides).  Although Christiansen 
and Eskridge’s primary focus in their new study is the factors that tend to 
correlate with overrides and the nature of the overrides themselves, they also 
include two variables that track the effects of overrides: An assessment of 
whether the override statute has been interpreted “normally” by lower courts, 
or whether it has been interpreted unusually broadly or narrowly, and an 
assessment of whether lower courts agree or disagree about the meaning of 
an override.
88
 
Given the problems that have spurred my prior work, I was struck by 
Christiansen and Eskridge’s finding that about 75% of the overrides were 
given what they deemed to be a “normal” interpretation.89  Those that were 
not “normally” interpreted were split roughly 50/50 between interpretations 
that Christiansen and Eskridge characterized as unduly narrow, or actually 
invalidating the override, and those that they characterized as surprisingly 
broad.
90
  They also found that courts quickly reached consensus on the 
meaning of most overrides, with about two-thirds resulting in an 
“immediate” consensus and 99% percent reaching a consensus within 10 
 
85. See Widiss, supra note 20, at 567–80. 
86. See Widiss, supra note 23, at 926–41. 
87. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1443 & n.446 (citing to Widiss, supra note 20, 
and Widiss, supra note 23). 
88. See id. at 1434–36 
89. Id. at 1435 fig. 34. 
90. Id. 
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years.
91
  Christiansen and Eskridge do not break these findings down by 
“types” of overrides, but again, I independently assessed the data for 
overrides since 1985 to see if there were differences between restorative and 
non-restorative overrides.  I found that there was not much variation, but that 
the levels of judicial consensus were a little higher for restorative overrides 
than for other overrides.
92
 
These results merit further investigation, in part because they are 
strikingly different from the results of a study of overrides conducted by 
political scientist Jeb Barnes.  Barnes looked at a data set of 100 randomly 
selected overrides that was based largely on Eskridge’s 1991 study (and 
accordingly included overrides of both Supreme Court and lower court 
decisions). He found that there was a high level of judicial dissensus—
defined as either a circuit split or a significant intracircuit split—about the 
rule established by the override in just under half of his total.
93
  And he found 
that the levels of judicial dissensus varied dramatically by subject matter.
94
  
There was almost total consensus about the rule established by tax 
overrides.
95
   By contrast, there was dissensus in every civil rights override in 
his database; more generally, he found that only one in ten cases concerning 
minority rights, in any context, yielded consensus.
96
  His research also found 
that contexts where there had been high levels of partisan divide in the 
interpretation of a statute before an override tended to yield higher levels of 
dissensus after the override.
97
 
There are several possible explanations for the differences between 
Barnes’s findings and Christiansen and Eskridge’s findings.  The research 
teams may have used different coding conventions regarding what constitutes 
“dissenssus” or “consensus.”98  They also covered different time periods.99  
 
91. Id. at 1435, 1436 fig. 35. 
92. Specifically, of those for which there was sufficient information available to make a 
judgment, 70% of the restorative overrides were coded as reaching immediate consensus, whereas 
67% of the non-restorative overrides were coded as reaching immediate consensus. There was also 
little variation between categories when looking at the scope of the interpretation.  Analysis on file 
with author. 
93. BARNES, supra note 30, at 90. 
94. See id. at 169–71. 
95. See id. at 169. 
96. Id. at 171. 
97. Id. at 169–70. 
98. Barnes’s analysis focused on whether there were circuit splits or significant intracircuit 
dissensus in the years shortly after the override, and also looked at the extent to which later 
decisions were applied consistently by judicial appointees from both parties.  Id. at 79–98.  He used 
a seven-to-ten-year time horizon that seems roughly consistent with that employed by Eskridge and 
Christiansen.  Id. at 78. 
99. A quick review of the data suggests that the different time periods covered is unlikely to be 
the explanatory factor.  Looking at overrides enacted after 1991 shows about 70% of those for 
which there was sufficient information to make a judgment were coded as reached consensus 
quickly, which is roughly consistent with Christiansen and Eskridge’s findings for the full data set. 
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And one data set included lower court cases, while the other was made up 
entirely of Supreme Court cases.  But a key difference may also be the 
process through which Christiansen and Eskridge identified lower court cases 
to assess the level of consensus and whether the override language is “fairly” 
interpreted.  They generated the cases for review by using Westlaw’s “citing 
reference” function to identify cases that cited the override statutes.100  This 
approach thus necessarily focuses only on cases where courts have flagged 
the override as potentially relevant to the matter and then gone on to interpret 
it. This method will not catch any cases in which the override arguably could 
be deemed relate to the case at hand but is not.  The time lags discussed 
above demonstrate that for many overrides, there are considerable delays in 
linking together an override and the precedent that it addresses.  Looking at 
the other side of the coin—that is, citation patterns of overridden cases—my 
coauthor and I find that often there is very little change after an override.  
This suggests that in a significant number of instances, courts may continue 
to cite the overridden precedent without citing, let alone interpreting, the 
override statute at all.
101
 
IV. Making It Easier  
A. Identifying Overrides 
Christiansen and Eskridge have done a remarkable amount of work to 
compile their list of overrides.  Professor Hasen, likewise, did a remarkable 
amount of work to compile his list of overrides. But it should not be this 
difficult.  That is, the findings regarding false positives, false negatives, and 
delay in the Westlaw identification process demonstrate that in some 
instances lower courts may not even know about an override for several years 
after an override occurs, and, in many instances, lower courts are not sure 
how to integrate the statutory amendment into their otherwise precedent-
focused analysis.  Thus, in addition to the many suggestions that Christiansen 
and Eskridge lay out for making overrides more effective (all of which seem 
quite sensible to me), I add a simple one: Congress should state in statutory 
language that it is intending to override a prior judicial decision. 
Congress does this occasionally.
102
  But it is rare.  Looking at the 
overrides Christiansen and Eskridge identify that were enacted since 1985, I 
 
100. E-mail from Matthew Christiansen, Yale Law School to author (Feb. 14, 2014, 14:12 EST) 
(on file with author). 
101. Brian Broughman & Deborah A. Widiss, After the Override: An Empirical Analysis of 
Shadow Precedents (Feb. 27, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  
102. See, e.g., Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5, 5   
(“Congress finds . . . [t]he Supreme Court in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 
618 (2007), significantly impairs statutory protections against discrimination in compensation that 
Congress established and that have been bedrock principles of American law for decades[,] by 
unduly restricting the time period in which victims of discrimination can challenge and recover for 
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found that less than 10% included the name of the case in legislative 
language, and generally this was in restorative overrides where Congress was 
especially vehement about wanting to express its disapproval of prior 
Supreme Court decisions.
103
  This should change.  When Congress knows it 
is responding to a prior judicial decision, it should indicate its intent in 
statutory text, as well as in any committee reports for the statute.  These are 
precisely the kind of statements that were typically found in legislative 
history a generation ago, the disappearance of which posed such challenges 
for the more recent research teams.
104
  Such statements could also indicate 
whether Congress seeks to supersede a prior decision completely or only in 
part.  
This would have several benefits.  First, it would clarify Congressional 
intent in a form that fully satisfies bicameral and presentment requirements.  
Second, pursuant to Westlaw protocol, it should result in the overridden 
precedent being immediately red flagged, thereby presumably helping 
decrease the considerable lag time that otherwise often occurs before lower 
courts start to consider the interaction of the precedent with the override.
105
  
And finally, it would make it relatively easy for the Congressional Research 
Service (CRS), the Legislative Counsel’s office, administrative agencies, or 
other enterprising researchers to regularly compile and disseminate a list of 
all (identified) overrides. 
Of course, this might invite a different problem.  As indicated above, 
looking at ex ante indicators to determine Congressional intent to override 
suggests that sometimes Congress may be unaware of precisely which prior 
precedents are affected by subsequent statutes, particularly when Congress is 
 
discriminatory compensation decisions or other practices, contrary to the intent of Congress.”); 
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553 (“Congress finds . . . 
the holdings of the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and its 
companion cases have narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA, 
thus eliminating protection for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect.”); Older 
Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (“The Congress finds 
that, as  result of the decision of the Supreme Court in Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio 
v. Betts, 109 S. Ct. 256 (1989), legislative action is necessary to restore the original congressional 
intent in passing and amending the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.”) 
103. See Broughman & Widiss, supra note 101. 
104. See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1328; Hasen, supra note 13, app. IV at 259. 
Moreover, Congress could also include, again ideally in statutory language, more general statements 
regarding the proposed intent of its override, such as an expectation that the overridden precedent 
would no longer be relied upon in general or applied to other statutes.  Christiansen & Eskridge, 
supra note 1, at 1444–45; Widiss, supra note 20, at 562–63; see also Widiss, supra note 23, 920–25 
(discussing proposed override bill that would have applied to “any Federal law forbidding 
employment discrimination” and “any law forbidding . . . retaliation”, an approach which was 
reasonable in light of recent Supreme Court decisions refusing to apply overrides to statutes with 
similar language but which would cause a host of new interpretative problems). 
105. In fact, Westlaw is not totally consistent in red-flagging cases even when the statutory 
language clearly indicates disapproval with a prior decision and the substantive provisions override 
the interpretation in that decision. See supra note 83. 
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enacting a wholesale restructuring of a given area of statutory law. 
Christiansen and Eskridge have already suggested that the CRS or the 
Legislative Counsel’s office undertake research to determine when multiple 
statutes might need to be amended to end reliance on an overridden decision. 
This addresses a problem that I have called “the hydra problem,” in which 
failure to amend all statutes containing similar language is interpreted as 
acquiescence to ongoing application of an overridden precedent or other 
disfavored interpretation.
106
  (In principle, I agree with Christiansen and 
Eskridge’s suggestion, but, as I have discussed elsewhere, in practice, it 
would often be difficult to correctly identify the full universe of potentially 
affected statutes and politically unworkable to open up multiple statutes to 
revision.
107
)  I would add to their suggestions that CRS or Legislative 
Counsel, or perhaps executive branch offices, should also take on 
responsibility for systematically assessing when new statutory language 
would modify existing precedents.  They could flag this fact for bill drafters 
so that they could explicitly address such precedents in the bill language, or 
so that agencies could disseminate information about an override. 
However, even if one of these offices were to endeavor to identify 
overrides regularly, it would be extremely difficult to develop a 
comprehensive list.  Accordingly, it would be imperative that where a fair 
reading of new statutory language impacts prior precedent, a failure on 
Congress’s part to explicitly state its intention to do so in statutory text would 
not be interpreted as grounds for narrowly interpreting the import of the new 
statutory language to leave a prior precedent in place.  Christiansen and 
Eskridge argue for reduced reliance on the meaningful variation, whole act, 
and whole code canons of interpretation generally, noting that cases that rely 
on these canons are disproportionately likely to be overridden
108
 and do not 
accord with the realities of the legislative process.
109
   At the very least, given 
the challenges in identifying all precedents that are affected by an override, 
the fact that in certain statutes Congress explicitly mentions an intent to 
override should not be read to infer lack of a comparable intention in other 
contexts. 
B. Applying Restorative Overrides 
The interventions discussed above would help ensure that courts know 
overrides have occurred and provide guidance to courts on Congress’s intent 
in enacting them.  But it might not address a deeper set of issues that arises 
 
106. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1445–47; Widiss, supra note 23, at 887–81. 
107. See Widiss, supra note 20, at 563–64; Widiss, supra note 23, at 920–26. 
108. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1401–08. 
109. Id. at 1406  (citing Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from 
the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 
STAN. L. REV. 901, 934–35 (2013)). 
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with interpreting restorative overrides.  The data reviewed above suggest that 
restorative overrides are quickly red flagged, but, in at least some cases, they 
are unreasonably narrowly interpreted. In prior work, I have suggested that in 
many instances, this could stem from “good faith” confusion on the part of 
judges, particularly lower court judges, about the extent to which a 
subsequent statutory amendment supersedes otherwise binding precedent.
110
  
I have also posited that, at least in some cases, it could also reflect judges’ 
efforts to implement their own policy preferences, and that they use the 
interpretive complexities posed by overrides as a fig leaf to justify this 
practice.
111
  Christiansen and Eskridge agree that these problems are 
recurring, largely endorsing the concerns I have explored and proposing 
several concrete steps that Congress could take in drafting override that 
might minimize them.
112
  They also suggest that Congress might choose to 
delegate more interpretative functions to agencies generally, and specifically 
to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which is charged with 
enforcing the primary civil rights laws that govern employment.
113
 
These proposals are helpful, and I hope Congressional drafters will heed 
them.  But it is also important that Christiansen and Eskridge’s provocative 
assertion that their study of overrides suggests an “inversion of Carolene 
Products”114 should not be read to alleviate larger concerns regarding the 
restrictive way in which the Supreme Court frequently interprets civil rights 
statutes.  That is, Christiansen and Eskridge highlight the extent to which 
minority groups and women have been “winners” at obtaining overrides.  
The corollary of this statement, however, is equally important: Courts have 
repeatedly interpreted civil rights statutes narrowly enough to trigger efforts 
to enact overrides.  Moreover, at least if later Congresses are to be believed, 
such interpretations have repeatedly been contrary to the intent of the original 
enacting Congress.
115
  To make it worse, the Court has often then interpreted 
the override itself narrowly, requiring Congress to enact yet another 
override.
116
  Obviously, this requires additional political muscle and drains 
Congressional and advocates’ resources that could be focused elsewhere.  
And, while it is true that advocacy groups have successfully lobbied to have 
 
110. See Widiss, supra note 20, at 523. 
111. See id. 
112. Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1442–48. 
113. Id. at 1448–-49. 
114. Id. at 1381. 
115. See supra note 102. 
116. See, e.g., Widiss, supra note 20, at 542–46 (discussing Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), in which the Court adopted a very narrow interpretation of a 
previous override).  Ledbetter was subsequently overridden by the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 626, 794a, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
5,-16); Widiss, supra note 23, at 879 & n.98 (discussing a series of overrides and narrow 
interpretations of such overrides leading to more overrides related to fee-shifting provisions in civil 
rights statutes). 
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some of these decisions overridden, many other constraining interpretations 
remain on the books.
117
 
There is a deeper issue here.  Since these statutes often implicate core 
principles of equality and the interaction of the state and federal government, 
courts retain the ultimate trump card in this back-and-forth: The possibility of 
declaring Congress’s more expansive understanding of equality, and the 
necessary steps to achieve equality, to be unconstitutional.  For example, the 
Court recently held that a key provision the Voting Rights Act 
reauthorization—which included two overrides118—to be unconstitutional.119  
It may also soon hold that disparate impact liability in employment 
discrimination law—also the subject of an important override120—is 
unconstitutional.
121
  More generally, the Court has proven quite hostile to 
efforts by Congress or state and local governments to implement substantive 
understandings of equality, striking down, for example, affirmative action 
plans in government employment or contracting
122
 and in education,
123
 as 
well as efforts by school districts to use race as a factor in assigning students 
to schools to facilitate integration efforts.
124
 
One response is to deem this wholly appropriate.  It is the Court’s job to 
protect Constitutional guarantees of individual rights against potential 
incursion by a majority insufficiently responsive to minority interests.  But 
this easy answer ignores a deeper truth implicit in Christiansen and 
Eskridge’s findings—these statutes and government programs are being 
struck down in “reverse discrimination” claims brought by white litigants 
challenging what they contend is unjustified discrimination against them. 
And the Court refuses to defer to the legislative or governmental interests put 
forward in support of the law or policy because the Court is applying 
 
117. See, e.g., Widiss, supra note 23, at 920–26 (discussing unsuccessful efforts to override 
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009), in which the Court, in a 5–4 decision, adopted 
a very narrow interpretation of a previous override).  The Court subsequently relied on Gross, again 
in a 5–4 decision, to further curtail the significance of the prior override.  See Univ. of Tex. Sw. 
Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2520 (2013). 
118. See Hasen, supra note 13, at 221–22 (discussing the overrides in the VRA). 
119. Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (holding Section 4 of the Voting 
Rights Act unconstitutional). 
120. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §2(2), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), -5(g)(2)(B)) (overriding Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 
(1989)). 
121. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 595–96 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (warning of a 
coming “war” challenging the constitutionality of disparate impact doctrine). 
122. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J. 
A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); . 
123. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).  The Court did permit a more limited use of 
race as a factor to achieve educational diversity—see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)—
but has recently signaled such policies must be very carefully scrutinized.  See Fisher v. Univ. of 
Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
124. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
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heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause,
125
 a heightened 
scrutiny that was initially premised on the assumption that minority groups 
lack sufficient power in the democratic process.
126
  If the concerns articulated 
in Carolene Products have in fact been inverted, it may be time to reconsider 
the way in which the heightened scrutiny to which it gave birth is exercised 
to undermine legislative efforts to implement expansive understandings of 
what equality can, or should, mean. 
V. Conclusion 
Overrides are presumed to play an extremely important role in protecting 
Congress’s authority to shape the meaning of legislation.  But despite their 
centrality in theories of the separation of powers, we have known relatively 
little about when and how they occur—or even that they occur.  Professor 
Eskridge’s 1991 study was enormously influential not only because of its 
own findings, but also because simply compiling a relatively comprehensive 
list of overrides made it possible for other researchers to further explore the 
subject.  The new study likewise provides many important—and some quite 
surprising—conclusions about the nature of overrides and the factors that 
tend to predict overrides, as well as a treasure trove of new data for future 
explorations.  But I hope that we will not need to wait twenty years for the 
next comprehensive list of overrides.  Overrides do not just matter to political 
science and legal scholarship; they matter to courts and to all of the 
individuals, businesses, and government agencies whose actions are 
regulated by statutory law.  Congress needs to flag more clearly in statutory 
language when it overrides a judicial decision so that courts can promptly 
and accurately integrate these statutory amendments into their analysis.  
Identifying overrides should not be this hard. 
 
125. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720, 733–35; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270, 275; City of 
Richmond, 488 U.S. at 494, 508 (each explaining that all racial classifications receive strict scrutiny 
and holding that each challenged policy failed to survive such scrutiny). 
126. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  But cf. Johnson v. 
Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cnty., Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 677 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the interests of white working class men are inadequately protected in Congress because of the 
strength of organized groups asserting the interests of specific minority constituencies). 
